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ABSTRACT 
In the information age the security of information is one of the 
primary issues and any vulnerability in this regards can have 
devastating effects. Implementation of cryptographic algorithms to 
protect identification, authentication or data storage has been the 
prime focus in cryptographic arena specially for smaller handheld 
devices. This Project deals with implementation of efficient CRT-RSA 
algorithm for digital signature generation in smart cards and new 
scheme   to make it secure against Bellcore attacks. Generally 
smartcards have very limited computational power so RSA-CRT is 
widely used in order to generate digital signature with a reasonably 
large key with reasonable speed. but despite being fairly 
tamperproof ,smartcards are vulnerable to side channel attacks like 
fault attacks, timing attacks etc. One of the simplest fault attacks  is 
named  Bellcore attack, which seriously compromises the security of 
the system because of it revealing the secret factorization of RSA 
modulus and nature of fault induced doesn’t matter. This project 
aims at implementing algorithm using RSA and Chinese remainder 
theorem which is secure against bellcore attack and alerts in case of 
fault. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  1 
 
 
 
 
 
                          INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Security means the protection of the information from any sort of 
unauthorised access or manipulation through eavesdropping or 
guessing, mathematical or probabilistic algorithms, ciphers and other 
methods. And cryptography is the science which is used to achieve 
these security goals. 
    In the modern age, it’s not possible to permanently keep the 
information under tight container to achieve these security goals 
because of the most of systems are based on the free flow of these 
information and cost as well as efficiency issues make it not an 
option at all. 
The main concerns of cryptography include Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability. Cryptography encrypts the static or travelling 
information so that unauthorised access to the information is not 
possible .regarding authentication ,cryptography is also used to make 
sure that rightful candidates from multiple parties attempting to get 
access to a system are authenticated properly and subsequently 
given access to system. 
Cryptographical algorithms are used to encrypt the messages so that 
information is not extracted from by party other than to which it has 
been sent.   
 Integrity is achieved by cryptography by checking messages for any 
changes made by unauthorised entities or unauthorised methods 
and alerting the concerned parties regarding this. Digital signatures 
are used to achieve it. 
Availability is also a component of information security. The 
information stored must be available to  authorized parties  
whenever required. And prevention of threat to this aspect is so 
achieved by using cryptographic methods. 
Different types of cryptosystems are used for different purposes and 
in different conditions considering the speed, vulnerability or 
environment etc. 
But cryptosystems can be widely classified into two main categories 
symmetrical and asymmetrical (or public key) cryptosystems. In 
symmetrical cryptosystems only one key is used by both the 
communicating parties for encryption and decryption. 
In case of asymmetrical cryptosystems there is a set of two keys: 
public key and private key. Here public key is an open secret and can 
be used by anyone. Whereas private key is secret and is used by a 
single party.Despite being mathematically related these key are 
almost non obtainable from each other. In case of normal encryption 
the public key is used to encrypt and private key is used to decrypt 
the message but reverse is true for digital signatures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            CRYPTOGRAPHIC         
ARITHMETICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
    Cryptographic algorithms are based on some very essential 
mathematical theory. Some of the  theorems and algorithms have 
been discussed in this chapter. Which have been used in our planned 
work. 
 
2.2 Modular Arithmetic 
Modular arithmetic is a branch of arithmetic for integers, where 
numbers wrap around after they reach a certain value - the modulus. 
For any nonnegative integer a and positive integer n, if we divide a 
by n, we get  an integer remainder r and an integer quotient q that 
obey the following relationship: 
a= kn+r ; 0≤r<n;  q= a/n 
The remainder r is often referred to as a residue. If a is an integer 
and n is a positive integer, we define a mod n to be the remainder 
when a is divided by n. The integer n is called the modulus.  
Thus, for any integer a, we can always write:  
a= a/n x n + (a mod n) 
Properties   of Modular 
Arithmetic for integers                             
 
Property                                                                                                            
 
Commutative laws  (w + x) mod n = (x + w) mod n (w 
× x) mod n = (x × w) mod n  
Associative laws  [(w + x) + y] mod n = [w + (x + y)] 
mod n [(w × x) × y] mod n = [w × 
(x × y)] mod n  
Distributive laws  [w × (x + y)] mod n = [(w × x) + (w 
× y)] mod n [w + (x × y)] mod n = 
[(w + x) × (w + y)] mod n  
Identities  (0 + w) mod n = w mod n (1 + w) 
mod n = w mod n  
 
 
2.3 Euclidean Algorithm  
Euclidean algorithm is a simple and efficient method to find the HCF 
two positive integers. Nonzero b is known to be a factor of a if a = nb 
for some n, where a, b, and n are integers. We will use the notation 
gcd (a, b) to mean the highest common factor of a and b. The 
positive integer c is defined to be the greatest common divisor of a 
and b if c is a divisor of a and of b and any divisor of a and b is a 
divisor of c.  
An equivalent definition is the following: gcd(a, b) = max(p, such that 
p|a and p|b).  
Because we require that the greatest common divisor be positive, 
gcd (a, b) = gcd (|a|, |b|).   
Two integers a and b are coprime if their only common positive 
integer factor is 1. This is other way of saying that a and b are 
relatively prime if gcd (a,b)= 1.  
The Euclidean algorithm’s base theorem is  
“For  any positive integer b and any nonnegative integer a, gcd (a,b) 
= gcd(b, a mod b)”. 
 
2.4 Prime Numbers  
An important aspect of Modular and cryptoarithmetic is the study of 
prime numbers. t. An integer p > 1 is a prime number if and only if its 
only divisors are ± 1 and ±p. Prime numbers play a critical role in 
cryptographic techniques discussed later. If P is the set of all prime 
numbers, then any positive integer a can be written uniquely in the 
following form: 
  
It is easy to find the highest common factor of two positive integers if 
we could express each integer as the product of prime factors.  
The right-hand side is the multiplication of all  possible prime 
numbers  p; for any particular value of a, most of the exponents ap 
be 0. 
For many Cryptosystems, it is mandatory to select one or more very 
large prime numbers at random.  
But barring some probabilistic algorithms there is no any simple yet 
efficient algorithm is known for primality test of a large number. 
 
Miller Rabin primality  test:- 
One of the Primality testing Algorithms is Miller Rabin primality test. 
Now, let n be an odd prime. Then n−1 is even and we can write it as 
2s·d, where s and d are positive integers (d is odd).  
For each , either 
 
or 
 for some  
 
So if we can find an a such that 
 
and 
 for all  
 
then a is a witness for the compositeness of n (sometimes 
misleadingly called a strong witness, although it is a certain proof of 
this fact). Otherwise a is called a strong liar, and n is a strong 
probable prime to base a. The term "strong liar" refers to the case 
where n is composite but nevertheless the equations hold as they 
would for a prime. 
 
 2.5 Fermat’s And Euler’s Theorems  
Euler’s theorem and Fermat’s theorem play crucial role in public key 
cryptography. Fermat's theorem states that: If p is prime and a is a 
positive integer not divisible by p, then 
ap-11(mod p)  
 Euler's totient function is also an important entity in number theory 
and written φ (n),  and defined as the number of positive  coprime 
integers less than n .By convention, φ (1) = 1.  
if we have two prime numbers p and q, with p not equal q. Then it 
can be show that for n = pq, φ (n) = φ (pq) = φ (p) x φ (q) = (p-1) x (q-
1)  
Euler's theorem states that for every a and n that are relatively 
prime: 
a(n)1(mod n). 
2.6 The Chinese Remainder Theorem  
The Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) states that  
Integers in certain range can be reconstructed from their residues 
modulo a set of pair wise relatively prime moduli.  
One of the mostly used features of the Chinese remainder theorem 
is  to manipulate (potentially very large) numbers mod M in terms of 
tuples of smaller numbers. This can be useful when M is 150 digits or 
more. However, note that it is necessary to know beforehand the 
factorization of M.  
 
Theorem 1. Let m and n be integers with gcd (m, n) =1, M=m*n and 
let b and c be any integers. Then the simultaneous congruences  
x  b(mod m) and x  c( mod n) 
have exactly one solution with 0≤x≤M.  
 
Proof: We begin by solving the congruences The solution consists of 
all numbers of the form x= my + b. We substitute this into second 
congruence, which yields  
my c - b(mod n) 
We are given that gcd (m, n) =1, so the linear congruence Theorem 
tells us that there is exactly one solution y1 with 0≤ y1<n. Then the 
solution to the original is given by x1=my1+b; and this will be the only 
solution x1 with 0≤x1<M, since there is only one between 0 and n, 
and we multiplied y1 by m to get x1. This completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 2. Let m1(x),m2(x),...,mr(x) denote r prime polynomials of 
degree p (p≥1) that are relatively prime in pairs, and let b1  ,b2 ,...,br 
denote any r prime polynomials of degrees at most p-1. Then the 
system of congruences  
xbi(mod mi(x))  i =1,2,3,...,r  has a unique solution g(x), where  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
 
 
                                                               
REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 RSA Digital Signature Scheme 
 
The RSA idea is also used in for signing and verifying a message .In 
this case it is called  RSA Digital signature scheme. The digital 
signature scheme changes the roles of public and private keys. First 
the private and public keys of the sender not the receiver are used. 
Second the sender uses her own private key to sign the document; 
the receiver uses the senders public key to verify it.   
The conventional Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) is to determine a 
single integer from its remainders from a set of moduli. It has 
tremendous applications in various areas, such as cryptography and 
digital signal processing.  
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) allows for an efficient 
implementation of the RSA algorithm. The theorem is as follows. 
Given input, m, raise it to the e-th (or d-th) power modulo p and 
modulo q. The intermediate results are then combined through 
multiplication and addition with some predefined constants to 
compute the final result (the modular exponentiation to N). This 
approach is often used for implementing RSA in embedded systems. 
It requires four times less execution time and smaller amount of 
memory for intermediate results, since modular exponentiation is 
performed on half the bit size of N. 
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                                             (b)Verifying 
 
Chinese Remainder Theorem has been used for hundreds of years 
and has been applied to many domains such as integers and 
polynomials as explained in last chapter. It can also be modified to 
design proxy signatures 
 
3.2 Use of Chinese remainder theorem and RSA in 
smartcards & it’s vulnerability towards fault attacks 
Smartcards play an important role in modern cryptography. 
Smartcards are used to compute digital signatures,most notably 
digital signatures based on RSA. Since speed is still an issue with 
modern smartcards, enhancements have been adopted to the plain 
RSA signature algorithm. The 
most common enhancement is the computation of an RSA signature 
using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT).We will refer to this 
variant of RSA as CRT-RSA. With CRT-RSA one can expect speed up by 
a factor of 4 compared to plain RSA.  
However, smartcards are not as tamper-resistant 
as one may wish. Hence side-channel attacks like fault, power, and 
timing attacks, on smartcards have attracted a lot of attention. 
M’ M       Accept Se mod n 
Among the side-channel attacks, fault attacks seem to be easiest to 
realize. In particular, CRT-RSA proved to be susceptible to fault 
attacks. In an 
extremely simple attack on CRT-RSA is described. Named the 
Bellcore attack, this attack reveals the secret factorization of the RSA 
modulus N by introducing a single fault resulting in a signature that is 
correct modulo one of the secret prime factors of N, but faulty 
modulo the other prime 
factor. This attack is particularly devastating because the type of 
fault induced is irrelevant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     DIGITAL SIGNATURES  
AND SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Digital Signature Generation using CRT-RSA Algorithm 
In case of digital signature generation sender uses a one way  hash function to 
calculate a message digest and then he signs it using private key and receiver 
verifies the integrity of message using the public key of the sender. 
4.1.1 Basic  CRT-RSA algorithm 
Key generation 
1. Select two distinct prime numbers p and q 
2. Compute n = pq.  
3. Compute euler’s phi totient, φ = (p-1)(q-1) 
4. Select public key e < n such that gcd(e, phi)=1 
5. Compute d = e-1 mod phi. 
6. Compute dP = d-1 mod (p-1). 
7. Compute dQ = d-1 mod (q-1). 
8. Compute qInv = q-1 mod p where p>q. 
Signing:- 
1. Compute mP=MdP mod p,where M is hash of the message. 
2. Compute mQ=MdQ mod q. 
3. Compute h= qInv(mP-mQ) mod p. 
4. Return: Sig=mQ+h*q. 
Verification:-  
1. Compute M’=Sige mod N. 
2. Compare M and M’ ,where M is the hash of the received message. 
3. If(M  M’) then accept. 
4.1.2 Vulnerablity of CRT-RSA Against Fault Attacks 
It’s been showed that if an error can be introduced in mP or mQ(not in both) 
the the factorization of N can be found out from the faulty signature and a 
correct one. 
Suppose error has been introduced in mP making it mP’ and the resulting 
signature is Sig’ then the value of q can be found out by 
gcd((Sig’)e – M (mod N),N)=q; 
And p=N/q and so secret keys are recovered. 
4.2 Modifications in CRT-RSA to Counter Fault Attacks 
Several kinds of countermeasures against fault attacks(Bellcore attacks) have 
been suggested, for example to compute a signature twice and compare the 
two results or to verify the result with the public key before outputing. 
However, these two methods are too costly to be of practical interest.so we go 
for few other more effective and efficient countermeasures discussed ahead. 
4.2.1 Shamir’s Countermeasure 
The idea consists in computing the two half exponentiations, mP and mQ in  a 
redundant way. 
Let t denote a random k-bit integer for some security parameter k(typically k = 
32). Then the device computes 
mP*=Md mod tp and mQ* =Md mod tq 
and outputs 
         S= CRT(mP*,mQ*) mod N ,if mP*  mQ* (mod t) 
         Error                ,otherwise 
 
4.2.2 A Modified Approach by BlÄomer, Otto and Seifert  
They have proposed a new idea to protect every aspect of the computation of 
signature generation including the CRT combination. 
It can be achieved by using two small integers t1 and t2 to compute mP = M
d 
mod pt1 and mQ = m
d mod qt2.These values are combined to S mod Nt1t2 via 
the CRT. 
Precomputational Step 
A precomputational step is followed at the production time in order to 
generate a valid RSA key with (N,e) sa public key where N= p*q and the 
corresponding private   key d, where   e*d ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N).And additionally the 
two small integers t1 and t2 are also generated whic must allow the certain 
conditions to make sure the scheme is completely secure:- 
1. gcd(t1,t2)=1. 
2. gcd(d,(t1))=gcd(d,(t2))=1. 
3. t1 and t2 are squarefree. 
4. ti 3 mod 4 for i  {1,2}. 
5. t2 doesn’t divide X= pt1*((pt1)
-1 mod qt2),where pt1=p*t1 and qt2=q*t2. 
Algorithm(Infective CRT-RSA) 
1. Compute dP= d mod (pt1). 
2. Compute dQ= d mod (qt2). 
3. Compute et1 = dP-1 mod (t1). 
4. Compute et2 = dQ-1 mod (t2). 
5. Compute mP= MdP mod pt1. 
6. Compute mQ= MdQ mod qt2. 
7. Compute qt2Inv = qt2
-1 mod pt1. 
8. Compute h = (qt2Inv * (mP-mQ)) mod pt1. 
9. Compute s= mQ+ h* qt2. 
10. Compute c1=(M-(s^et1)+1) mod t2. 
11. Compute c2=(M-(s^et2)+1) mod t1. 
12. Return: 
 
                 Sig = (s^(c1*c2)) mod N ,if c1=c2=1; 
                 Error                               ,otherwise 
 
4.3 SOFTWARE USED : MATLAB with VPI(Variable Precision 
Integers):- 
When symbolic toolbox in MATLAB is not available VPI is best alternative to 
play with large integers written by John D’Errico.This is well documented. 
To use the vpi (Variable Precision Integer) arithmetic tools, we will need to 
have the top level directory (VariablePrecisionIntegers) on our MATLAB search 
path. 
Main Functions used from VPI in this project are described below with 
examples:- 
 vpi  - Creator function for a variable precision integer 
>>vpi('4658675395636539563983939649349221012460124720234835364873
682145') 
ans =   
465867539563653956398393964934922101246012472023483536487368214
5 
 randint - Generate random integers from the set [1:n], uniform, 
with replacement 
 
>>randint(vpi('465867539563653956794893219045658694021648353648736
82145')) 
 
ans = 
   6151104247090120003178240233118263943721876533961598987 
 
 nextprime     -Returns the smallest prime larger than an integer input. 
 
>>nextprime(vpi('4582891463982692165197896195015872326354327853419
723654298182834')) 
 
ans =   
458289146398269216519789619501587232635432785341972365429818321
9 
 
 powermod - Compute mod(a^d,n) 
>>powermod(vpi('458289146398269216519789619501587232635432785341
9723654298182834'),vpi('4658675395'),vpi('465867539563653956398393964
9349221012460124720234835364873682145')) 
ans =   
463958341568293554605854838006544499308199459046882054449971742
4 
 totient -     Compute euler’s totient function 
>>totient(vpi(‘2100289417064542343925053224693817826511802246632094
31069478460157826527761769759358877591139568786214009976311617’)
) 
ans= 
210028941706454234392505322469381782651180224663204848178014477
419832415225747821834572274861556643027083379945556 
 minv -         Compute multiplicative inverse modulo 
>>minv(65537,vpi('458289146398269216519789619501587232635432785341
9723654298183219')) 
ans =   
405255518275461127377990567450073773485530863617854410390378888
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
                         IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Digital Signature Scheme using RSA with CRT  
5.1.1 RSA with CRT for Signature Generation By sender 
 
M =   
342784643950386265423498759365173387345894536257824864538258238
435735632856467589734632524945654689436325598674569022519042876
64              
p =   
104915396960119927201630972583681496129259704522616388700181806
740437 
q =   
106201486708719353119399266190219638979391534377188310570290153
797219 
d =   
953095371886047153145368193398489390567899964364476453286357692
865004766913424428269766412663544077767329894013749462032827019
350042097       
dp =   
518885936443286571003626152304021901221858614628616660350487953
65637 
dq =   
107113817712839300565974815679288312503437453992891760817495142
6827 
qinv =   
878585031551241112293783371923448378096472363129827559969160205
08914 
Sig =   
202037638221536373981256290516149217930873579606432767140255312
397839776319492297092888274576594724429327437395360847938950902
9516144744      
5.1.2 Signature Verification at reciever 
 
Sig =   
202037638221536373981256290516149217930873579606432767140255312
397839776319492297092888274576594724429327437395360847938950902
9516144744      
e = 65537 
N =   
111421711358001912728662139298531571868798537218256677343967221
044051018427497224881414843172046476479487902894799091684604878
04665444703     
M1 =   
342784643950386265423498759365173387345894536257824864538258238
435735632856467589734632524945654689436325598674569022519042876
64              
As we see Here M1= M .So Integrity of message is intact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Signature Scheme using BlÄomer, Otto and Seifert Algorithm 
immune against Bellcore fault attack 
5.2.1 Signature generation  
p = 
213928282115986527253941166277644177340936800207163776980697941
849920059 
q = 
219983661384571964375224988250004473701420069040103559737953488
47836989 
t1 = 
    11 
t2 = 
   375 
dP =   
188129060751995024487500081061781557446345529716946958576672059
4750016429 
dQ =   
319650958687988307697110037842015289515475237857457734662309917
2153029809 
qt2inv =   
218733157331802628767671187768284402788160667124772537670064250
835051662 
M= 
753849565646723435645972364664862542349806705428610937456394002
456567745025362462509674856291980453645309623527697547349067569
2346236569032 
mP =   
211283696626567672022528898050040491903167753119525340452268970
2004791692 
mQ =   
462124579440084382410457569708070484036410893145028229528555784
2583325582 
h =   
226404622722528642944051041052567870102730175588041166757483024
1449958617 
s =   
186769941978354407085857645046229239058701991604019466509397272
507751467549177920017675589637198647904732146381010749640547254
66856666847039905457                                                                    
et1 = 
   9 
et2 = 
   89 
N =   
470607267735863625807605061632682765199145871542485700926227531
535827132218917099419078357604323997099211456226339773002006676
2618844713262351                                                                        
Sig =   
329781407637203653999565903807178276809097759611403818701879943
352614847116149681852973398028858557650405503991277133510055278
5091024814896689 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Verification Of Signature  
Sig =   
329781407637203653999565903807178276809097759611403818701879943
352614847116149681852973398028858557650405503991277133510055278
5091024814896689  
e =65537                                                                       
N =   
470607267735863625807605061632682765199145871542485700926227531
535827132218917099419078357604323997099211456226339773002006676
2618844713262351                                                                        
M1 =   
753849565646723435645972364664862542349806705428610937456394002
456567745025362462509674856291980453645309623527697547349067569
2346236569032 
Here again we find that M1=M .Thus message or Signature is not tampered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The above project was under taken in order to implement efficient 
and safer algorithms for Digital Signature of RSA system in 
Cryptography. Various types of Symmetrical and Asymmetrical 
Cryptography methods were studied along with their mathematical 
backgrounds. First RSA with CRT was used  to speedily generate 
digital signature and verification and Finally a modified form of CRT-
RSA secure against Fault attack was implemented with MATLAB.   
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